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FCC Licensing: From Comparative
Hearings to Auctions
Jonathan Blake*
The way in which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) determines who, among competing applicants, will receive
licenses for radio frequencies has a profound impact on how spec-
trum-based businesses and services are regulated. The FCC's choice of a
licensing mechanism not only permeates the entire regulatory fabric of our
communications industries, arguably the most important of the twenty-first
century; it also reflects our society's priorities. A survey of how other
countries award licenses, which is beyond the scope of this essay,
reinforces this view.
Auctions are the latest licensing mechanism of choice, but they have
not altogether replaced the earlier licensing mechanisms of comparative
hearings and lotteries, which continue to be available when the FCC is
required to use them or believes it is appropriate to use them.
Much ballyhooed, the new auction process is, legally, much less
extensive in scope than some believe. For example, Blair Levin, Chief of
Staff to FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, at the opening of the first-ever FCC
auction process on July 25, 1994, stated that auctions inaugurate a new era
in which the government no longer will tell prospective users of spectrum
how they can use it; users will decide for themselves. In fact, however, the
auction mechanism applies only to the third step in the three-phase process
that Congress has entrusted to the FCC and does not permit licensees to
decide how they will use spectrum. Still, there is pressure to break down
this barrier, and in recent years, the FCC has drafted its use requirements
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more and more broadly, thereby giving licensees more flexibility to respond
to consumer preferences.
The first step is the decision as to what generic uses specific
frequency bands can be put. In this first, or "allocation," phase the FCC
continues to decide that a certain amount of megahertz located in a certain
portion of the spectrum can be used for cellular telephone service or radio
broadcasting or taxi dispatch service. As new uses for the spectrum are
discovered or invented, spectrum has to be found to accommodate them.
Fortunately, scientific advances also are allowing the use of spectrum that
could not previously have been used or allow it to be used more intensively
than in the past. Both kinds of breakthroughs make room for new spectrum
uses and generate new allocation decisions.
A second step which is needed only in some services, most notably
broadcasting, is the allotment process. Thus, if the FCC has decided to
allocate some 400 MHz of spectrum for television use nationwide, it must
still decide whether Channel 9 will be used in Baltimore, Washington, or
Richmond.
The last step, the assignment or licensing process, occurs only after
the frequencies have been allocated and allotted. Then, it is necessary to
license them to the public. It is at this stage that the FCC uses comparative
hearings, lotteries, or auctions to choose among competing applicants.
The premise of the comparative hearing process was that because the
airwaves are public property, the government should license them so as to
most benefit the public. Using the public interest as its touchstone, the FCC
should decide how they should be used (allocations), where they should be
used (allotments), and who should be licensed to use them (assignments).
Eventually cracks in that model began to appear. When the FCC made
clear how it would choose among competing applicants, applicants naturally
structured themselves to earn high scores under these criteria. Applicants
made promises about programming and ownership that they did not live up
to at all, or not for long. It also meant that all applicants began to look
alike; they all received high marks. So, the FCC stretched to make
distinctions based on tenuous, insignificant grounds, such as the famous
case where one applicant for a broadcast station received a hearing
advantage because it promised more restroom facilities than its adversary.
Another problem was time and expense. With three rounds of agency
decision making-before an FCC administrative law judge, the Review
Board, and the Commissioners themselves-plus review by the court of
appeals, the comparative hearing process often required more than a decade
and a ton of money.
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Judge Leventhal, in a noted case, observed that the comparative
hearing approach might be suited to achieving a pool of high-quality
applicants, but perhaps a lottery process would be just as effective and less
expensive and time-consuming where the differences between the best two
or three applicants were insignificant.
It is not clear whether this was intended as a legislative proposal, but
certainly it was the rationale for many congressmen, particularly those who
had a lingering faith in government's role, who voted for lotteries as a tie-
breaking mechanism to be used by the FCC where two or more applicants
were equally qualified. This pragmatic approach to lotteries was also
expressed by commissioners confronting the task of picking between
equally well-qualified cellular applicants.
But pragmatism was not the rationale of others who supported
lotteries as a licensing mechanism. President Reagan, his first FCC
Chairman, Mark Fowler, and his successor, Dennis Patrick, profoundly
distrusted government's ability to make licensing decisions. When
Chairman Fowler spoke of television as a toaster with pictures, he meant
many things. But one of them was that the government should have no
greater regulatory role with respect to television than with respect to
toasters, except as required by technical considerations. In fact, the FCC
used lotteries not for a tie-breaking function but to pick among scores of
applicants, with only the winners having to be found minimally qualified.
As with comparative hearings, but at a much quicker pace, serious
shortcomings with the lotteries emerged, first and foremost in the cellular
lotteries. It became almost immediately apparent that they encouraged
speculation. Applications were filed by those who did not wish to construct
and operate cellular systems and probably could not have done so. Schemes
to "game" the lotteries mushroomed. Rules to prevent this were devised,
but the gaming was often one step ahead of the regulations. The process of
resolving disputes about whether improprieties had occurred posed its own
adjudicatory headaches and delays, and generated its own abuses. Thus, at
one point, a third of the rural cellular licenses were being held up because
of disputes. Lotteries had not turned out to be so much faster or cheaper
than comparative hearings.
Moreover, because lotteries were every person's chance for a big
payoff and winners routinely sold their licenses as soon as possible to real
operators, it was soon observed that lotteries led to private auctions. In turn,
this led to the question: why shouldn't the government conduct the
auctions? Under such a system, the government, not lucky lottery winners,
would reap the value of the spectrum on behalf of the public to whom it
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belonged, and the delays and controversy surrounding lotteries would be
avoided.
Furthermore, this was the policy goal that Chairman Fowler had really
been after all along, not so much to raise money for the government, but
because he believed that, according to the laws of the marketplace, the
highest bidder would best use the spectrum in the public interest. This
repudiated the principle of government as decision maker on which the
comparative hearing mechanism had been based.
Reluctantly and because of fiscal needs, Congress authorized auctions
on a permissive basis, only for five years, and not for broadcast frequen-
cies. But even Congress was thrilled by the first auction results, and the
momentum toward making auctions permanent and expanding their scope
was palpable and immediate.
Within two days of the second set of auctions, however, some of their
potential for abuse emerged. Winning bidders balked at making payments,
and the FCC soon announced that it was investigating the possibility of
collusion and other bidding abuses.
Another defect had been apparent from the outset and had been
addressed somewhat by the auction legislation. Auctions could turn
spectrum-based businesses into a bastion of the most well-financed, often
incumbent companies--companies that might even be willing to make
premium bids to acquire spectrum that otherwise might be used for
innovative new services competitive with the services the established
players were already operating.
With the seeming blessing (though not unmixed or specific) of
Congress, the FCC addressed this problem by constructing various
advantages in the broadband personal communication services (PCS)
auctions for small businesses, rural telcos, minorities, and women. Some
argue that these advantages are not sufficient; others argue they go too far;
still others claim that they will lead to shams, with powerful incumbents
controlling these so-called designated entities through various investment
mechanisms. The debate recalls the effort in broadcast comparative hearings
to give hearing merits to applicants that included minority own-
ers/managers. The policy worked in the sense that many winners of
comparative hearings contained minority owners/managers. But early
ownership shifts by winning applicants were common. The result was that
meaningful, long-term minority participation was not greatly enhanced.
Another problem with lotteries and auctions is that they provide no
assurance that the best service will be rendered to the public. Arguably, a
local or national PCS system, to take one example, is important to the
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public and should not be entrusted to a blind choice determined only by the
size of the competitors' bids.
The auction apologists would argue that the government should set
high qualifying standards and tough performance requirements to ensure
that good systems and service will result, whoever is the highest bidder.
But the FCC has not and probably will not do so. The emphasis on raising
money is too single-minded, notwithstanding Congress's express direction
to the FCC that only public interest factors, not monetary considerations,
should direct the FCC's implementation of its auctioning authority.
However, the FCC's modest standards for applying for, constructing,
and operating new spectrum-based services like PCS will be invoked in
petitions to deny the applications of winning bidders. Once again litigation
expense, delay, and abuse will be introduced into the process.
Shams, collusion, trafficking, nonperformance, delays, litigation
expense, and poor quality service will, therefore, be part of the auction
experience. Excessive bidding will add its own peculiar pressures to these
tendencies. Requests for delays in meeting payment obligations have
already been made. Winning applicants that have overbid may ask to be
excused temporarily or indefinitely from construction deadlines or coverage
or other service requirements. They may ask permission to dilute their
minority or female ownership because the total financial burden is greater
than they expected, and new nonminority and nonfemale funding will be
needed to survive. Winning applicants may also seek to use their frequen-
cies for different purposes than those for which they were allocated.
Auctions, in short, will breed their own problems, and though the
solutions proposed for these problems may in some circumstances be
market-based, still the government must select, craft, and implement them.
No solution is problem-free: all licensing mechanisms contain the potential
for abuse. The search for a risk-free mechanism is illusionary. Better to
knuckle down to the difficult responsibilities of implementing an imperfect
process than to proclaim the arrival of the millennium.
Undoubtedly, the choice of auctions will have ramifications well
beyond licensing. The comparative hearing process led to an absurd
preoccupation with licensee performance-counting the seconds of program
material devoted to public affairs topics, interviewing leaders in sixteen
categories of public life, etc. The lottery heyday was characterized by
nihilism. Even those few regulations that remained on the books were
enforced only grudgingly, if at all. For example, the FCC took thirteen
months after a decision to impose must-carry rules on cable television
systems to craft that decision, and the forty-page decision mentioned the
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public interest only once. Many speculated that even that was an oversight.
Not surprisingly, the decision was overturned by the courts.
In the auction era, where dollars are equated with public worth and
maximizing dollars will be the most important criterion, there will be
strong pressure to also base allocation and allotment decisions on this
standard. Public television, which received one-third of the station channels
allotted in the 1950s and 1960s, would not be so fortunate today. Police
and fire departments still have enough political clout to gain access to
spectrum. But others who propose new services will have to produce
dollars quickly if they expect to gain entry to radio frequencies. The whole
notion of public service and the public interest will be eroded, except in the
case of broadcasting where specific provisions have been legis-
lated-indecency, equal employment opportunity (EEO), drug convictions,
alien ownership, children's programming, and political material.
Auctions, in other words, will generate their own serious problems
which should not be underestimated or denied. It seems that the task of
government has become so daunting that we anoint a few constituencies
with very pressing needs, give them special leverage, and throw everything
else back on the market. Perhaps this is the way to go, but a better guess
is that auctions are only the latest step in the ongoing dialectic and that we
will continue to struggle toward a balance between private initiative and
public oversight.
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